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Abstract
Planchon, Jade. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May, 2018. Essays in Finance. Major
Professor: Thomas H. McInish, Ph.D.
This dissertation presents two papers that examine fixed income shorting during periods
of unconventional monetary policy. Specifically, I explore whether shorts predicted Federal
Reserve policy following the financial crisis as well as their reactions following Fed
announcements of large scale asset purchases of Treasuries and agencies.
Essay 1 studies short selling during periods of unconventional monetary policy. In
November 2008, the Federal Reserve announced the first of a series of unconventional monetary
policies, which would include asset purchases and forward guidance, to reduce long-term interest
rates. I investigate the behavior of shorts, considered sophisticated investors, before Fed
announcements that were not fully anticipated in spot bond markets. Short interest in Treasury
and agency securities declined prior to expansionary surprises, indicating shorts anticipated these
news, and declined further after these announcements. The failure of shorts to reinstitute their
positions after the last purchase announcement confirms that the Fed convinced sophisticated
investors that interest rates would remain low.
Essay 2 extends the work of Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (Journal of Finance, 2007), who
find that shifts in the demand curve predict negative stock returns, to examine changes in supply
and demand at the time of Fed announcements. I show that shifts in the demand for borrowing
Treasuries and agencies predict quantitative easing. A reduction in quantity demanded at all
points along the demand curve predicts expansionary quantitative easing announcements.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation comprises two essays in finance. The first essay studies short selling of
Treasuries and agencies during periods of unconventional monetary policy. I focus on short
sellers because they are viewed as informed, sophisticated investors. The second essay examines
the supply and demand for borrowing Treasuries and agencies (a proxy of short selling) prior to
Fed expansionary (“buy”) announcements.
In the first essay, I investigate whether shorts anticipated the surprise components of Fed
bond purchase announcements and how they reacted following the announcements. That is, I
examine whether the Fed convinced sophisticated short investors that interest rates would remain
low. I initially focus on a broad set of unconventional policy announcements during QE1, QE2,
MEP, and QE3. I later shift the focus to four early and particularly surprising, expansionary
announcements during QE1. Focusing on these events should be a more stringent test of shorts
ability to predict policy surprises given the magnitude of the change in long yields following
these announcements. Additionally, I study short sellers response to Fed announcements that
indicated reduced or slowed purchases of Treasuries and agencies.
In the second essay, I use a unique approach developed by Cohen, Diether, and Malloy
(Journal of Finance, 2007) to test whether shorts predicted Fed announcements during QE1 –
QE3. I find that the majority of Treasury and agency securities experience a demand shift inward
one week and one month prior to Fed buy announcements. Further, the distribution of shifts prior
to buy announcements is statistically different than for the control period.

Chapter 2
Unconventional monetary policy and the behavior of shorts
1. Introduction
The collapse of international housing prices in 2006-2008 produced extreme credit market
disturbances that culminated in the September 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a major
investment bank, and a severe downturn in real economic activity. In response, the Federal
Reserve (Fed) initiated a variety of emergency unconventional measures to stabilize the global
economy. The unconventional actions included “forward guidance” about the path of the federal
funds rate target and a series of announcements of asset purchases that totaled several trillion
dollars over the following ten years. Kohn (2009) calls these “large-scale asset purchases”
(LSAP).1 The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced and implemented
unconventional policies in four phases: Quantitative Easing 1 (QE1) in 2008-2010, QE 2 in
2010-2011, the Maturity Extension Program (MEP) in 2011-2012 and QE 3 in 2012-2014.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some sophisticated investors initiated short positions prior
to the financial crisis to profit from it.2 The Big Short (Lewis, 2011) chronicles four such
investors who predicted bond defaults that would be triggered by a credit and housing market
collapse. Lewis (2011) suggests that at least a few individuals were discerning enough to foresee
macro events, but it is also true that the counterparties were often other sophisticated institutions.
Using securities borrowing as a proxy for short interest, we empirically investigate whether
shorts anticipated the surprise components of Fed bond purchase announcements and how they

1

The Fed tried similar long-bond purchases before, but on a much smaller scale. The best known example occurred
in the early 1960s when the Fed attempted to influence the long end of the yield curve in “Operation Twist.” Using
an event study approach, Swanson, Reichlin and Wright (2011) find that “Operation Twist” moderately reduced
Treasury yields and had smaller effects on corporate yields.
2

Short positions included shorting stocks and bonds exposed to the subprime market, such as large investment banks
(e.g., Citigroup, Lehman Brothers, and UBS), as well as credit default swaps on subprime mortgage bonds.

2

reacted to those moves. That is, we examine whether the Fed convinced sophisticated short
investors that interest rates would remain low.
Specifically, we initially focus on a broad set of 21 unconventional policy announcements
during QE1, QE2, MEP, and QE3 (Figure 1). We later shift our focus to four early and
particularly surprising, expansionary announcements during QE1—labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4, in
Figure 1. Focusing on these events should be a more stringent test of shorts ability to predict
policy surprises given the magnitude of the change in long yields following these early
announcements. In other words, they are events that the marginal investor in spot and futures
markets did not fully anticipate.
Figure 1 shows the 10-year-Treasury yield and future price changes surrounding each of 21
events pertaining to FOMC statements, speeches or press releases or announcements associated
with unconventional policy during the four phases.3 Futures prices rise by $1.547, on average,
for the four announcements compared to $0.297 for all other announcements. The 10-yearTreasury yield falls 28.4 bps, on average, over these four announcement windows, compared to
an average of fall of 6.9 bps for other announcements. To further show the importance of the
four buy announcements that we study, Appendix 1 compares the magnitude of the $ΔBorrowed
Quantity for our events to net changes over subperiods. The ΔBorrowed Quantity for the
windows around the four announcements is accounted for 43.8% of the decrease from Period 1Control through Period 4-Post. Further, the ΔBorrowed Quantity for the windows around four

3

The 10-year Treasury yields data are from Bloomberg and the change is the one-day change around the event. The
futures price data are from Tickwrite quotes and the change is calculated based on the futures price 15 minutes
before to 90 minutes after each announcement. Most events in Figure 1 have been previously studied in papers such
as Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Neely (2015) or
Wright (2012).
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chosen announcements is larger, on average, than the ΔBorrowed Quantity around the Lehman
bankruptcy.
To presage our results, we find significant short covering prior to and following asset
purchase announcements. These findings are consistent between the focused study of four events
and the broader regression study of all 21 events. Short interest remained low throughout 2009
and early 2010 (following the initial set of QE announcements), indicating that the Fed did
convince shorts that interest rates would remain low.
We examine short interest because data are available for these sophisticated investors. Data
on trades of other sophisticated investors such as hedge funds, mutual funds, and insiders are
either not available or available only with delay.
Predicting important monetary policy surprises is a particularly stringent test for shorts
because publicly available information almost entirely determines the path of monetary policy.4
To earn abnormal returns, shorts must outpredict the marginal spot / futures investor in very deep
markets with little or no private information but abundant public information. The short investor
cannot simply follow market sentiment, which the spot price should immediately reflect, or the
short investor would never foresee an abnormal risk-adjusted return and would never have a
speculative incentive to increase or decrease his/her position.
Consistently outpredicting the marginal investor in spot bond markets is probably much more
difficult that predicting the fortunes of a single company better than the limited group of analysts
who focus on it. Indeed, markets appear to be fairly efficient in anticipating changes to the

4

There are many examples of public information that potentially sheds light on monetary policy. For example, the
Fed releases minutes of FOMC meetings after three weeks and FOMC participants frequently publicly express their
policy views, which are largely based on publicly available information. Bernanke (2002), for example, presaged the
use of quantitative easing in the context of the Japanese economy, 6 years before it was attempted in the United
States: “To stimulate aggregate spending when short-term interest rates have reached zero, the Fed must expand the
scale of its asset purchases or, possibly, expand the menu of assets that it buys.”
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021121/
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federal funds target. Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) show that implied federal funds rates from
futures are only modestly biased predictors of the federal funds target, slightly overpredicting the
rate implied by final futures settlement by 3 to 6 basis points per month of forecast horizon, on
average. These authors interpreted this small bias as reflecting risk premia rather than a
systematic forecasting error (Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008).
In contrast, equity analysts can gather information from a variety of primary, non-public
sources including employees, suppliers, and customers (e.g., channel checks, surveys, etc.). In
addition to conducting primary research, they often privately communicate with management.
Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2014) find that such communication is a more useful input to
analysts’ forecasts than their own primary research. These proprietary inputs (primary research
and private communication with management) as well as other publicly available information
(earnings guidance and previous 10-Q/10-K reports) inform earnings predictions before audited
financials are publicly released. Shorts have proved themselves to be adept at discerning whether
these earnings announcements will affect stock prices.
We use securities borrowing obtained from Markit as our proxy for short interest. These data
are available daily and cover individual CUSIPs of both Treasuries and agencies.
There are at least three other ways to profit from falling bond prices—selling futures, using
repurchase agreements (repos) to borrow securities to short, and purchasing credit default swaps
(CDSs). But each of these has disadvantages for studying the behavior of shorts compared to our
approach.
Traders cannot, for example, use futures to short individual CUSIPs because many securities
are potentially deliverable on each futures contract.5 Another difficulty with futures data is that

5

One might argue that the cheapest to deliver is a single bond, but which bond is cheapest to deliver can change.
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separating the trades of short speculators from those of hedgers is problematic because these
classifications are self-reported. Private conversations with industry participants suggest that
these classifications are often unreliable.
Repos can also be used to borrow securities for short selling. However, data on repos for
individual CUSIPs are not readily available. Identifying which repos are used to borrow
securities to short can be difficult because repos are commonly used for other purposes, such as
to borrow funds or upgrade collateral.
Traders use CDSs to benefit from falling bond prices caused by deteriorating credit, but since
the U.S. is unlikely to default CDSs are not a substitute for shorting Treasuries and agencies.
Because each strategy has its own particular requirements, traders typically do not switch
between these four ways of profiting from falling bond prices.6 Several institutional features
constrain trading methods: participants in the securities lending market might be required to
enter into the Overseas Securities Lending Agreement or the Global Master Securities Lending
Agreement. Many institutions are prohibited from dealing in futures contract. To trade CDSs
directly, institutions need an International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) master
agreement, which might be difficult for smaller institutions to obtain.
2. Literature review
This paper unites two literatures: research that examines the characteristics and information
content of short selling and research studying asset market reactions to unconventional monetary
policy. This section briefly reviews these literatures to frame the unique contribution of the
current paper.

6

To some extent, these limitations could be overcome by dealing through financial intermediaries.
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2.1. The short selling literature
Short sellers are widely viewed as informed, sophisticated investors. In equity markets, short
sales correctly predict negative returns (Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan, 1998; Boehmer,
Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009; Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2007), aid
price discovery (Boehmer and Wu, 2013), and exploit profitable opportunities provided by
downgrade announcements (Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh, 2010). Short sellers do not anticipate
news, but have superior ability to process news (Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2012).
Researchers similarly find that short sellers adjust their portfolios prior to the release of
useful information in fixed income markets, although shorting in such markets has received
much less attention than in equity markets. Nashikkar and Pedersen (2007) find short selling of
corporate bonds increases before a rating downgrade, which indicates that certain investors
anticipate the rating change. However, these authors cannot discern whether the increased short
selling is due to private information, superior research ability, or whether prices react slowly to
public information. Additionally, Hendershott, Kozhan, and Roman (2017) find that corporate
bond shorts predict future bond returns. In contrast, Asquith, Au, Covert, and Pathak (2013) find
that heavily-shorted corporate bonds do not earn abnormal returns, indicating that investors’
private information does not motivate these short sales.
2.2. Literature related to unconventional monetary policy
By definition, bond yields can be decomposed into an expected future short rate and a term
premium. The theoretical literature on unconventional monetary policy suggests several channels
by which such policies could influence yields through one of these components. The most widely
cited channels are signaling, portfolio balance, and local supply (substitution) channels.

7

Signaling effects refer to the possibility that Fed announcements change expected future
short-term interest rates. That is, the Fed might commit to zero interest rates beyond its normal
horizon, which Eggertsson (2006) refers to as “committing to be irresponsible.” To the extent
that signaling affects expected short yields, it should affect all bond yields, whether the Fed
purchased those bonds or not.
Forward guidance presumably produces only signaling effects and no portfolio balance
effects. The FOMC has offered forward guidance through at least five variations of “extended
period” language to restrain expectations of policy rate hikes.
In contrast to the single channel through forward guidance may be effective, asset purchase
announcements may both signal future interest rates and directly affect term premia. That is,
asset purchases can signal a path for interest rates by changing the Fed’s incentives to raise rates
quickly in the future. A central bank with a large quantity of long-maturity bonds will incur
capital losses when bond yields increase; this reduces the central bank’s incentive to raise
quickly policy rates (Bhattarai, Eggertsson, and Gafarov, 2015).
If short bonds were perfect substitutes for long bonds, then ex ante term premia would be zero
and signaling would be the only active transmission channel; the Fed’s unconventional policy
could only affect long yields through the expected future short rate. Short bonds are imperfect
substitutes for long bonds, however, and therefore the Fed’s unconventional policy actions can
also affect the term premia on bonds through the portfolio balance channel (Tobin, 1958). This
channel allows a bond purchase to directly affect term premia by reducing quantities of certain
types of risk in the public’s hands and therefore reducing the required premium to hold this risk.
Portfolio balance arguments about QE most commonly reason that a purchase of long bonds
reduces yields by reducing the amount of duration risk in the market. But Krishnamurthy and
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Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) argue that removing duration is less important than removing certain
maturities of very safe assets. This “safety channel” is a version of the portfolio balance channel
in which some investors strongly prefer certain maturities of very safe assets.
Either version of the portfolio balance channel predicts larger changes in expected returns to
assets that are more similar to those of the purchased asset. In other words, Fed asset purchases
that change term premia of purchased assets will also change term premia of related assets to the
extent that they are substitutes. Purchases of particular issues may also produce “local supply
effects”—i.e., differential price reactions—for purchased and not-purchased securities that have
very similar characteristics. In summary, unconventional monetary policy should affect all bond
yields in the same direction, although not necessarily to exactly the same extent.
Event studies provide strong evidence that unconventional monetary policies influence a
broad variety of bond and other asset prices through both signaling and portfolio balance
channels. Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011) calculate that a surprise announcement of
a one trillion USD purchase of long-term bonds reduced 10-year U.S. Treasury yields by about
30 to 50 basis points and produced a similar fall in yields of low-grade corporates.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Hancock and Passmore (2011) demonstrate
that mortgage-backed securities (MBS) yields and retail mortgage rates fell further still, partly
through reductions in default risk and prepayment risk.
D’Amico and King (2013) present evidence that agents consider broad classes of long bonds
to be significantly, but not perfectly, substitutable. These authors show that bond prices for all
Treasuries and agencies increase at the time of the LSAP announcements, regardless of whether

9

the Fed actually purchases a particular security. However, these authors also show that the actual
transactions have local supply effects on specific issues, as described previously.7
The effect of unconventional policy is not confined to U.S. bonds. Bauer and Neely (2014)
show that a purchase of U.S. bonds can both reduce expected future short rates and the term
premia for international substitutes. Unconventional policy announcements also increase stock
prices (Kiley, 2014) and substantially reduce the foreign exchange value of the USD and
international bond yields (Neely, 2015). These boosts to bond and stock prices also affected
emerging markets (Bowman, Londono and Sapriza, 2015).
3. Data
3.1. Data collection and definition of variables
We use daily lending data from Markit Securities Finance for January 2008 to June 2013 for
Treasury and agency securities, and Lehman Brothers stock. Participants in the securities lending
market, including prime brokers, custodians, asset managers, and hedge funds, report these
lending data. Available Quantity is the quantity of inventory available to lend (based on par
value) and, hence, to short. Our proxy for short interest, Borrowed Quantity, is the total quantity
of debt on loan, net of double counting (based on par value). We also use Utilization (Borrowed
Quantity/Available Quantity) as a proxy for short interest for our robustness tests (Appendix 2)
and our results are quantitatively similar.
The System Open Market Account (SOMA) Holdings report, which is publicly available on
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s (FRBNY) website, details open market securities

7

D’Amico and King (2013) focus on the Treasury market following the March 18, 2008 announcement. The authors
find that the average purchase operation temporarily reduced yields by 3.5 basis points in the sector of the purchase
and that the program as a whole (beginning with the announcement and concluding with the final purchase) shifted
the yield curve down by up to 30 basis points.
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purchases by CUSIP.8 Amount Purchased is the amount the Fed purchases each week (based on
par value). The FRBNY website also provides Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) lending
data.9
Datastream is the source for bond-level characteristics: issue size, coupon rate, duration, timeto-maturity, time-since-issuance, and yield-to-maturity. Our sample comprises securities with (1)
issue size information in DataStream, (2) time-to-maturity of greater than five years at least once
during the sample, (3) mean Available Quantity of greater than $10 million over the sample
period, (4) mean Borrowed Quantity greater than $1 million over the sample period, and (5) at
least 30 daily observations.10
Initially, we examine announcements during QE1-QE3. Then we focus on four important
QE1 announcements that conveyed important information and raised expectations of easier
monetary policy in asset markets. We denote these four announcements as follows: LSAP-B1,
11/25/2008; LSAP-B2, 12/1/2008; LSAP-B3, 12/16/2008; and LSAP-B4, 3/18/2009.
Collectively, we label these as “All announcements.”
We divide the QE1 sample into four sub-periods:
•

Period 1-Control (1/1/2008–8/31/2008);

•

Period 2-Heart of the Crisis (9/1/2008–11/17/2008);

•

Period 3-Announcements (11/18/2008–3/25/2009); and

8

https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/soma/sysopen_accholdings.html

9

https://apps.newyorkfed.org/markets/autorates/tslf/historical/search

10

We exclude securities with time-to-maturity of less than 5 years because the zero lower bound constrained
movement of those yields during the period of our study. According to Swanson and Williams (2014), however, 5and 10-year Treasuries remained sensitive to news until the last few weeks of 2012. In addition to the effects of the
zero lower bound, we exclude short-term securities because we believe that non-speculative reasons are more likely
to motivate borrowing of such assets.
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•

Period 4-Post-announcements (3/26/2009–3/31/2010).11

Hereafter, we refer to these four periods as P1-Control, P2-Heart, P3-Announce, and P4-Post,
respectively. P1-Control begins January 1, 2008. P2-Heart begins just prior to the spate of events
in September 2008. P3-Announce begins with LSAP-B1. P4-Post begins just after LSAP-B4 and
ends at the conclusion of QE1 purchases.
Table 1 summarizes bond-level characteristics of the 124 Treasuries and 716 agencies in our
QE1 sample.
All statistical tests are at the 0.05 level or greater unless otherwise stated.
3.2. Important QE1 events
By late 2008, delayed indirect effects from the 2006-2008 collapse of the housing price
bubble had rendered financial markets dysfunctional, real activity weak, and left short-term
interest rates close to zero. The initial policy responses included the creation of the TSLF, the
government takeover of the Federal Housing Agencies, Fannie and Freddie, the purchase of
American Insurance Group (AIG), and the passage of the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) program. The first actions to expand unusually the monetary base were the Fed’s
stabilization / lender-of-last-resort actions—creating temporary facilities to fund purchases of
short-term private debt—in the weeks following the Lehman bankruptcy on September 15,
2008.12 Table 2 shows a timeline of important events associated with the crisis.13

11

D’Amico and King (2013) refer to 2009-2010 as the Fed intervention period and 2000-2008 and the nonintervention period.
12

These facilities included the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
(AMLF), the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) and the Money Market Investor Funding Facility
(MMIFF).

13

The Fed’s SOMA operates a securities lending program (SLP) that allows primary dealers to borrow securities
through the Fed’s competitive auction held each business day at noon Eastern Time. The SLP for Treasuries
operated throughout our sample period, but only began for agencies July 9, 2009. Given that the SLP is designed to
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To supplement these unusual policy interventions by both the Treasury and the Fed, the
FOMC repeatedly reduced the federal funds target from 525 basis points in September 2007 to a
0-25 basis point range on December 16, 2008. Long yields, however, did not follow short-rates
down prior to November 2008. Figure 2 shows no overall trend in long yields during P1-Control
and P2-Heart, but a substantial decline in the first half of P3-Announce. During P4-Post,
Treasury yields trended up while agency yields were stable.14
After initially focusing on restoring dysfunctional financial markets through its lender-of-lastresort role, the Fed soon shifted its attention to stimulating real growth and preventing
undesirable disinflation with forward guidance and asset purchases. The FOMC took the first
step in asset purchases on November 25, 2008, with a press release that announced plans to
purchase $100 billion in government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt and $500 billion in MBS
issued by those GSEs. On March 18, 2009, the FOMC doubled down by announcing that it
would purchase an additional $100 billion in GSE debt, $750 billion in MBS, and $300 billion in
long-term Treasury securities. These November 2008 and March 2009 asset purchase programs,
commonly called QE1, eventually totaled $1.725 trillion and roughly tripled the size of the U.S.
monetary base almost entirely through an increase in excess bank reserves. In addition to the two
explicit QE1 purchase announcements, monetary policy announcements on December 1, 2008
and December 16, 2009 (LSAP-B2 and LSAP-B3) lowered long yields immediately by creating
expectations of future bond purchases.
Table 3, Panel A, shows the four most important QE1 announcements on which we focus our
study. Table 2, Panel B, shows the periods during which the Fed purchased bonds under QE1.

aid overnight clearing and that the average tenor of securities loans for our Treasuries and agencies exceeds 75 days,
we do not believe that the SOMA SLP is relevant for our research design.
14

Agency yields are based on the Bloomberg-Barclays U.S. aggregate agency debt index.
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Under QE1, the FRBNY purchased agencies from November 25, 2008, until March 31, 2010 and
Treasuries from March 18, 2009, until October 30, 2009. Figure 3 illustrates the cumulative
interest rate change for Treasuries and agencies. While some of the purchase announcements
only mentioned Treasuries and not agencies (LSAP-B2 and LSAP-B3) or mentioned agencies
but not Treasures (LSAP-B1), Figure 3 shows that both Treasury and agency yields immediately
declined in response to all four announcement. This is consistent with event study evidence that
strongly implies that asset purchase announcements affected a wide range of yields. Therefore,
while we report the tests of these securities separately, we expect to find similar changes in the
borrowing market during the announcement period.
3.3. Borrowing market descriptive statistics
Figure 4 illustrates the time series of total daily Borrowed Quantity and Available Quantity
for Treasuries (Panel A) and agencies (Panel B). The vertical lines indicate the four LSAP
announcement days described in Table 2, which we consider in our study. Figure 4, Panel A,
shows that Treasuries’ Available Quantity (black line) shows no particular trend during the
sample, with some modest diminution during the heart of the crisis in the fall of 2008 and then
some recovery later. Panel A also shows that Treasuries’ Borrowed Quantity (light gray) is
roughly constant through August 2008, but then declines sharply at the beginning of September
as Lehman Brothers goes bankrupt and risk aversion soars. The decline levels off in January
2009. Figure 4, Panel B, shows that the Available Quantity and Borrowed Quantity (black and
light gray, respectively) of agencies similarly decline from September 2008 to March 2009 when
their decline moderates. It is difficult to tell from the figure, however, whether the policy
announcements are associated with significant changes in these quantities.
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Table 4 describes the average daily Available Quantity, Borrowed Quantity, and Utilization
by period of Treasuries (Panel A) and agencies (Panel B). For Treasuries, all three variables
decrease monotonically in the four sample periods. For agencies, Utilization decreases
monotonically while Borrowed Quantity and Available Quantity decrease period-to-period
except during P2-Heart where we find an uptick. The flight to quality during P2-Heart probably
explains these differing patterns between Treasury and agency borrowing markets. The agency
market faced uncertainty which could have increased the amount of shorting.
4. Hypotheses development
This section describes hypotheses to test the effects of the LSAP announcements and
purchases on the behavior of shorts.
If short sellers are sophisticated investors with more accurate expectations than the riskadjusted expectations of the marginal investor, then such short sellers will cover their short
positions prior to announcements, as soon as they come to believe that bond prices will rise.
When markets are efficient, the spot/futures bond prices reflect the risk-adjusted expectation of
the marginal investor, so the short investor must predict bond prices better than the marginal
investor to earn abnormal returns. . It is not sufficient for short sentiment to simply mirror that of
the spot market. In that case, the spot price would always mirror the risk-adjusted expectation of
the short investor and the latter would have no incentive to change his/her portfolio.
Hypothesis 1: Short interest declines in the five days prior to LSAP buy announcements.
We further hypothesize that expansionary Fed announcements credibly signal that long rates,
and therefore short interest, will remain low as long as short sellers do not believe bond prices
will fall. That is, a credible expansionary announcement will produce further declines in short
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interest in the days that follow. In addition, we hypothesize that shorts will believe that the Fed
intends to keep interest rates low over longer horizons.
Hypothesis 2: Short interest declines in the five days just after LSAP buy announcements.
Initially, we test Hypothesis 1 and 2 using a full set of QE1, QE2, MEP, and QE3
announcements (Section 5.1). In the Section 5.2 through 5.3, we turn our analysis to the four
early and particularly surprising, expansionary announcements. These should be easier to discern
if shorts can predict large policy surprises (see Figure 1).
Hypothesis 3: Short interest remains low during the whole P4-Post period.
We test Hypothesis 3 in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, we also examine announcements for
which the Fed surprised the market by indicating the possibility of reduced purchases, increasing
long yields. If shorts are able to anticipate such surprises, they should either increase or at least
not decrease short interest before such contractionary announcements.
At the time of announcements, the Fed does not indicated which specific securities will be
purchased. Hence, our analysis focuses on all Treasuries and agencies. But eventually the
securities actually purchased is known. We extend our analysis to examine whether
announcements differently affected purchased vs. not-purchased securities in Appendix 3.
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5. Empirical results
This section characterizes the shorts’ responses to LSAP announcements we initially study the
extended set of unconventional monetary policy announcements and then focus on a subset of
the most surprising announcements.
5.1. The impact of unconventional monetary policy shocks on Borrowed Quantity for QE1, QE2,
MEP, and QE3
To assess whether our hypotheses apply to a broader sample, we test a broad sample including
21 QE1, QE2, MEP, and QE3 announcements from 11/25/2008 to 6/19/2013 (see Appendix 4
for announcement descriptions). We use time-series regressions to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b,
that is, whether (1) %∆Borrowed Quantity before each announcement predicts the monetary
shock (∆Yield)) and (2) whether the monetary shock explains %∆Borrowed Quantity after each
announcement. We measure the monetary policy shock as the daily change in 10-year Treasury
yields (∆Yield) following each announcement and %∆Borrowed Quantity as the five-day
percentage change in borrowed quantity before and after each announcement.15 Specifically we
run following regressions:
∆Yield = β0 + β1*%ΔBorrowed Quantity_before + β2*TimeTrendDummy + ε

(1)

%ΔBorrowed Quantity_after = β0 + β1*∆Yield + β2*TimeTrendDummy + ε

(2)

All variables are defined in Table 5.
Table 5, Columns (1) to (3), show the results of predicting the monetary policy shock (proxied
by ∆Yield) with %∆Borrowed Quantity_before. Columns (1) and (2) show that the both the
Treasury and agency %∆Borrowed Quantity_before predict the monetary shock with the correct
15

Our results are quantitatively similar when using the intraday change—15 minutes before to 90 minutes after
announcement—in 10-year Treasury futures prices as the monetary shock variable.
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sign and to a statistically significant degree. A change of 1% in Borrowed Quantity before the
announcement is related to a ∆Yield of 2.6 bps and 1.1 bps, for Treasuries and agencies,
respectively. Because Treasury and agency %∆Borrowed Quantities are significantly correlated
(ρ = 0.62) and both are somewhat correlated with the time trend, we orthogonalize the Treasury
%∆Borrowed Quantity_before with respect to the agency %∆Borrowed Quantity_before when
using both in a joint regression.16 Column (3) shows that agency %∆Borrowed Quantity_before
and the orthogonal component of Treasury %∆Borrowed Quantity_before strongly jointly predict
the monetary shock.
Table 5, Columns (4) to (7), analyze the impact of the monetary shock on %∆Borrowed
Quantity following each announcement. An expansionary monetary shock (a decrease in interest
rates) significantly reduces %∆Borrowed Quantity of both Treasuries and agencies in the week
following the announcement, when one controls for %∆Borrowed Quantity before the
announcement. These findings are consistent with our results in Section 5.3 that shorts further
reduced their positions following monetary policy shocks. That is, the unconventional monetary
announcements credibly reduce expected yields over the longer term.
5.2. Did the shorts anticipate the LSAP purchase announcements?
Before turning to Treasuries and agencies, we informally illustrate the power of short
investors to anticipate asset price changes by examining shorting of Lehman common stock prior
to its bankruptcy. Figure 5, Panel A illustrates that Borrowed Quantity for Lehman equity
increased dramatically prior to the Lehman bankruptcy and only fell below beginning-of-2008

16

The orthogonalization prevents the coefficient on the agency Borrowed Quantity from becoming perversely
negative because of the correlation with Treasury Borrowed Quantity and the time trend.
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levels after the bankruptcy, likely reflecting both profit taking and reduced ability to borrow the
equity. In other words, a strong rise in short interest anticipated the Lehman bankruptcy.
In contrast to the strong rise in short interest in Lehman equity prior to September 2008, short
interest in Treasury and Agency bonds showed no particular trend over the same period. That is,
from January 1, 2008 to late August, the cumulative ΔBorrowed Quantity for Treasuries (black
line Figure 5, Panel B) fluctuates but remains mostly positive. However, this variable begins to
decline a few weeks prior to the Lehman bankruptcy, reaches beginning-of-2008 levels a few
days prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy, and continues declining through the first three LSAP events
before leveling off in January 2009. Cumulative ΔBorrowed Quantity for agencies (gray line,
Figure 5, Panel B) fluctuated more and had a modest uptrend until August 2008, a few weeks
prior to the Lehman bankruptcy, when it began to decline, in fits and starts, until May 2009.
Figure 5 provides suggestive evidence that both Treasuries’ and agencies’ ΔBorrowed
Quantity anticipated monetary policy shocks. Treasuries’ cumulative ΔBorrowed Quantity
declines sharply in the few days before a big expansionary move, LSAP-B4, on March 18, 2009,
which announced purchases of $750 billion of agency MBS, $100 billion of agencies and up to
$300 of Treasuries. Similarly, the sudden decrease in agencies’ ΔBorrowed Quantity a few days
prior to November 25, 2008 (LSAP-B1), the date on which the Fed announced large purchases of
agencies, indicates that shorts anticipated the direction of the surprise component of the
announcement. Although Figure 5 provides preliminary evidence that Hypothesis 1 is correct —
i.e., short interest in long bonds appears to have declined prior to surprisingly expansionary
LSAP announcements—one must carefully examine ΔBorrowed Quantity movements around to
each announcement to provide more conclusive evidence.
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Table 6, Columns (1) and (3) (labeled “Before”), show that Borrowed Quantity declines in the
five days before each of the four events for Treasuries and agencies, except for a slight increase
prior to December 1, 2008 (LSAP-B2) for Treasuries.17 For the Table 6 tests our control is 34
five-day changes during P1-control; the last row of Table 6 shows that Treasuries and agencies
have an average change of 0.17% and 0.82%, respectively, during the control period.
Table 6, Column (1), shows that short interest in Treasuries declines by 1.88% in the five days
prior to the November 25, 2008 LSAP purchase announcement. The March 18, 2009,
announcement (LSAP-B4) has the biggest effect on Treasuries’ Borrowed Quantity with a
10.93% decline in short positions (Column (1)). We believe that this very large decline occurred
because short investors anticipated, to some degree, the LSAP-B4 announcement of a massive
buy, with purchases of $750 billion in MBS, $100 billion of agencies and $300 billion of
Treasuries. Considering all announcements together, Table 6, Column (1), shows that Treasuries’
short interest declines by a statistically significant 3.79%, on average, prior to the
announcements.
The mean percentage decline in agency short positions, for all announcements, was even
larger than that for Treasuries. Table 6, Column (3), shows agencies’ short interest declines by an
average of 5.19% prior to the announcements. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis of no-change
in favor of Hypothesis 1, indicating that sophisticated short sellers reduced their short positions
prior to announcements.
The findings in Table 6 support Hypothesis 1.18
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We use a five-day window for our event study. For announcements that occur at the end of the day, the day after
the announcement is t0. For announcements that occur at the beginning of the day, the announcement day is t0. We
measure the “Before” period from t-5 to t0 and the “After” period as t0 to t5. A five-day window allows time for
traders to react to the announcement (which sometimes occurs at the end of the day) and for delays in settlement.
18

In addition to Borrowed Quantity, we also use Utilization as a proxy for short interest and find similar results (see
Appendix 3).
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5.3. How shorts respond just after the purchase announcements?
Table 6, Column (2) (labeled “After”), shows that Treasuries’ Borrowed Quantity declines in
the 5-days after each announcement, except the first.19 For all announcements combined,
Borrowed Quantity of Treasuries declines by a statistically significant 3.44%. The Borrowed
Quantity of agencies declines, on average, by a statistically significant 5.44% in the five days
after each announcement, although the decline for the first announcement is only significant at
the 0.1 level. These results support the hypothesis that shorts cover both Treasury and agency
positions following the LSAP announcements (Hypothesis 2). That is, the LSAP announcements
convince short investors that yields will stay low or decline further.
5.4. Did the shorts reinstate their positions following purchase announcements?
We have demonstrated that shorts reduced their positions prior to announcements that reduced
yields / raised bond prices, which is consistent with the view that some shorts anticipated the
surprise components of these announcements. We have also shown that shorts further reduced
their positions immediately after the announcements, suggesting that the announcements credibly
induced expectations of low yields in the short-term. These findings support Hypothesis 1 and
Hypothesis 2, respectively.
The Fed’s announcement of March 18, 2009 (LSAP-B4) was the last purchase announcement
of the QE1 program and the Fed paused for 20 months before embarking on further
unconventional polices. If the shorts anticipated that the Fed would maintain low interest rates
after LSAP-B4, then short interest should remain low after LSAP-B4. Table 7 shows means in
Borrowed Quantity on the first day of P4-Post (3/26/2009) and the last day of P4-Post
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Given that LSAP-B1 and LSAP-B2 are one week apart, LSAP-B1 after and LSAP-B2 before reflect the same time
window; therefore, the ΔBorrowed Quantity for LSAP-B1 after and LSAP-B2 before are equal.
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(3/31/2010). For Treasuries, the Borrowed Quantity mean declines by $228.5 million from
$1,269 million to $1,040 million from the first day to the last day. The difference is not
statistically significant but its sign is consistent with Hypothesis 3. For agencies, the Borrowed
Quantity declines significantly from $48.8 million to $33.6 million over the same period.
Clearly, short interest does not increase during P4-Post. These results reinforce our conclusions,
based on Figure 5, that the Fed was successful in convincing shorts that interest rates would
remain low, supporting Hypothesis 3.
5.5. Shorts’ reactions to Fed announcements of slowed buying
We also investigate short behavior around three Fed announcements that indicated reduced or
slowed purchases of Treasuries and agencies (“Slow Events”).20 We do not expect short interest
to decline prior to these announcements, whose surprise component was ambiguous or
disappointing.
Evidence in Table 8 confirms this expectation for both Treasuries and agencies. For
Treasuries, Borrowed Quantity increases an average of 1.52% and 0.65%, before and after the
announcements, respectively. For agencies, Borrowed Quantity increases an average of 0.26%
and 0.76%, before and after the announcements, respectively. Only three of the 12 changes in
borrowed quantity are negative and the overall changes are positive for both Treasuries and
agencies. These results reinforce our view that our proxy for short interest captures changes in
the sentiment of shorts.
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While the language in the 1/28/2009 announcement was expansionary the market did not view it that way. Prior to
this date, Federal Reserve officials had mentioned the possibility of purchasing Treasuries, but in the actual FOMC
communication the Fed failed to announce a purchase and therefore the episode disappointed the markets and
increased yields. Given that the 1/28/2009 announcement did not lead to a decrease in yields we categorize it as a
“Slow Event”.
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6. Conclusion
In response to the financial and economic crisis resulting from the collapse of the housing
bubble, in November 2008 the Federal Reserve began unconventional monetary policy programs
that included forward guidance and asset purchases. The Fed’s immediate goal was to reduce
long-term interest rates and term premia to stimulate investment and consumption. A series of
event studies persuasively showed that these programs successfully reduced long yields and term
premia and moved other asset prices, such as stock prices and foreign exchange rates, in desired
directions. The nearly unprecedented size and success of these quantitative easing programs has
rendered them one of the most important episodes in bond market history.
We investigate how shorts, widely regarded as among the most sophisticated investors,
reacted to the Federal Reserve’s LSAPs of Treasury and agency securities during QE1. Monetary
policy decisions are a stringent test for the forecasting ability of shorts who must outpredict
marginal investors in very deep spot/futures bond markets.
Specifically, we examine the behavior of short interest around four LSAP announcements that
produced unusually large interest rate changes. We find that short interest declined significantly
prior to surprisingly expansionary LSAP announcements, confirming that short sellers are
sophisticated investors who anticipated the unconventional announcements to some degree.
Similarly, short interest generally increased prior to LSAP announcements that failed to contain a
surprisingly expansionary component. We also find that short interest declined further following
the surprisingly expansionary announcements. The fact that short interest continued at lower
levels during the remainder of the Great Recession indicates that sophisticated market
participants believed that long yields were likely to remain low, either because of economic
conditions or unconventional policies.
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We then use time series regressions to reexamine these findings in a broader sample of 21
unconventional policy announcements, from 2008-2013. Regressions on this broader sample
confirm our conclusions: changes in short interest predict monetary policy shocks and
expansionary monetary shocks predict further reductions in short interest for both Treasuries and
agencies.
This research extends and complements previous research on the acuity of shorts as
sophisticated investors to a new context. It also indicates that the Federal Reserve
unconventional monetary policies were better understood by sophisticated investors than by the
marginal bond market investor and that expansionary announcements convinced those
sophisticated investors that yields would remain low for some time.
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Table 1
Issue characteristics of Treasuries and Agencies
Using data for our entire 27-month sample period, we present issue characteristics for Treasury agency
securities. We present means of issue size in Row 2. We weight the remaining variables by issue size.
Treasuries
Agencies
N
124
716
Issue Size (mill. $)
22,240
733
Coupon rate (%)
4.53
4.56
Duration (years)
6.26
6.76
Time-to-maturity (years)
10.47
9.03
Time since issue
6.15
4.69
YTM (%)
3.27
4.35
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Table 2
Important events during the Great Recession
We describe important events occurring during the Great Recession excluding the announcements
described in Table 2.
Event
Date
Note
FOMC reduces the federal funds target

12/11/2007 From 450 bps to 425 bps

Beginning of the Great Recession

12/1/2007 From NBER

FOMC reduces the federal funds target

1/22/2007 From 425 bps to 350 bps

FOMC reduces the federal funds target

1/30/2007 From 350 bps to 300 bps

TSLF announced

3/11/2008 Fed introduced Term Securities
Lending Facility (TSLF); allows banks
to borrow Treasuries while posting
impaired collateral

FOMC reduces the federal funds target

3/18/2008 From 300 bps to 225 bps

First TSLF auction

3/27/2008

FOMC reduces the federal funds target

4/30/2008 From 225 bps to 200 bps

Government Fannie and Freddie takeover

9/7/2008

Bank of America acquires Merrill Lynch

9/14/2008

Lehman bankruptcy

9/15/2008

AIG bailout

9/17/2008 Worth $85 billion

House rejects bailout plan

9/29/2008 Dow plunges.

TARP announcement

10/3/2008 Congress approves a $700 billion bank
bailout Friday, but stocks tumbled as
investors worried that the plan is
insufficient to stem the credit crisis.

FOMC reduces the federal funds target

10/8/2008 From 200 bps to 150 bps

AIG bailout

10/8/2008 Worth $37.8 billion

Wells Fargo acquires Wachovia

10/12/2008

FOMC reduces the federal funds target

10/29/2008 From 150 bps to 100 bps

FOMC reduces the federal funds target

12/16/2008 From 100 bps to 0-25 bps

End of the Great Recession

6/1/2009 From NBER

TSLF closed

2/1/2010

End of QE1, Start of QE2

8/10/2010
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Table 3
Important QE1 buy announcements
In Panel A, we identify and describe four days during QE1 when the Fed announced the forthcoming
LSAPs of Treasures and agencies. Panel B identifies the beginning and ending dates for the LSAPs.
Panel A: Announcements (focus of our study)
LSAP-B1
11/25/2008 FOMC announces intention to purchase $100 billion in agency
debt and up to $500 billion in agency MBS
LSAP-B2

12/1/2008 Chairman Bernanke says in a speech that the Fed could purchase
long-term Treasuries

LSAP-B3

12/16/2008 FOMC first mentions possible purchase of long-term Treasuries

LSAP-B4

3/18/2009 In a meeting statement, the FOMC says it will purchase an
additional $750 billion in agency MBS, increase its purchases of
agency debt by up to $100 billion, and buy up to $300 billion in
long-term Treasuries

Panel B: Purchases of securities
Agency purchases
Begin
11/25/2008
End
3/31/2010
Treasury purchases
Begin
3/18/2009
End
10/29/2009
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Table 4
Lending data for Treasuries and Agencies, by period
We present the means of the amount available to borrow—Available Quantity—and the amount actually borrowed—Borrowed Quantity— (both
in millions of USD based par value). We also present Utilization (%) which is the amount borrowed dividend by the amount available to borrow.
We weight all variables by issue size. We classify issues by whether or not they are purchased by the Fed as part of the LSAP program and by
period. Using a Wilcoxon rank sum test, we test the null hypothesis that the means for the securities purchased and not-purchased are equal and
present the resulting p-values. We present results for Treasuries in Panel A and for agencies in Panel B.
P1-Control
Initial phase (Control period)
1/1/2008 to
8/31/2008

P2-Heart
Heart of the crisis
9/1/2008
to 11/17/2008

P3-Announce
Announcement Period
11/18/2008
to 3/25/2009

P4-Post
Post-Announcement
3/26/2009 to
3/31/2010

Panel A: Treasuries
N
Available Qty
Borrowed Qty
Utilization

95
4,236
3,461
79

98
3,733
2,616
70

105
3,481
1,996
58

123
3,338
1,690
49

Panel B: Agencies
N
Available Qty
Borrowed Qty
Utilization

603
464
250
50

484
528
254
45

505
496
199
38

456
475
162
34
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Table 5
Time-series regression monetary shocks and Borrowed Quantity
We extend our analysis beyond QE1 to include all QE and MEP announcements from 11/25/2008 to 6/20/2013 (n=21). Appendix I lists these
events. This table reports results for the relation between %ΔBorrowed Quantity and 10-year treasury yield. We use the change in 10-year
Treasury yield as a proxy for monetary shock but the results are quantitatively similar if we use an intraday change in the 10-year Treasury
futures price as the proxy for monetary shock. ΔYield (in basis points) is the change in daily 10-year Treasury yield from the announcement
date to the following day. %∆Borrowed Quantity_Treasury_after and %∆Borrowed Quantity_Agency_after are the five-day %ΔBorrowed
Quantity following the announcement for Treasuries and agencies, respectively. %∆Borrowed Quantity_Treasury_before and %∆Borrowed
Quantity_Agency_before are the five-day %ΔBorrowed Quantity prior to the announcement for Treasuries and agencies, respectively. We
include a time trend dummy (1=first event; 21=last event). Column (3) reports the results of the second stage of a two-stage residual inclusion
model. Res_%∆Borrowed Quantity_Treasury_before is the residuals from the first-stage regression of %∆Borrowed
Quantity_Treasury_before on %∆Borrowed Quantity_Agency_before. * Indicates significance at the 5% level. Robust standard errors are
shown in parentheses.
%∆Borrowed Quantity_
%∆Borrowed Quantity_
Treasury_after
Agency_after
Dependent Variable
∆Yield
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
%∆Borrowed Quantity_Treasury_before
2.59
-0.60
(0.56)*
(0.25)*
Res_%∆Borrowed Quantity_Treasury_before
3.07
(0.75)*
%∆Borrowed Quantity_Agency_before
1.09
1.09
-0.07
(0.58)*
(0.43)*
(0.17)
∆Yield
0.02
0.15
0.17
0.18
(0.05)
(0.07)*
(0.06)*
(0.06)*
Time Trend Dummy
1.06
0.70
0.70
-0.04
-0.17
0.03
0.04
(0.35)*
(0.50)
(0.37)*
(0.14)
(0.13)
(0.14)
(0.14)
Constant
-13.22
-9.58
-9.58
-0.84
0.44
-2.27
-2.53
(4.37)*
(6.69)
(4.93)*
(1.76)
(1.63)
(1.83)
(1.94)
Adj. R-squared

0.61

0.31

0.63
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0.01

0.24

0.36

0.37

Table 6
The effect of LSAP announcements on short interest for all Treasury and agency issues
We analyze the four Fed announcements of LSAPs indicated below. For each announcement, we present
the five-day dollar and percentage ΔBorrowed Quantity before and after the announcement. We also
present these two variables (1) averaged over these four events, which we label “All Buy Events,” and
(2) for our P1-Control which comprises 34 five-day periods. Values are in millions of USD based on par
value. For Treasuries and agencies, we jointly rank the %ΔBorrowed Quantity for each CUSIP for the
control observations and the before-announcement and the after-announcement observations. We test the
null hypothesis that the means of the ranks for the two samples are equal against the alternate hypothesis
that the means for the announcements declined more and report the p-values. This is equivalent to a
Wilcoxon rank sum test.
Treasuries
Agencies
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Before
After
Before
After
LSAP-B1, 11/25/2008
$ΔBorrowed Quantity
-$3,686
$256
-$2,275
-$697
%ΔBorrowed Quantity
-1.88
0.13
-6.26
-2.05
p-values
0.02
0.16
<0.01
0.05
LSAP-B2, 12/1/2008
$ΔBorrowed Quantity
$256
-$12,952
-$697
-$2,955
0.13
-6.74
-2.05
-8.85
%ΔBorrowed Quantity
p-values
0.16
<0.01
0.05
<0.01
LSAP-B3, 12/16/2008
-$4,373
-$12,039
-$1,969
-$1,184
$ΔBorrowed Quantity
%ΔBorrowed Quantity
-2.46
-6.96
-6.68
-4.30
0.17
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
p-values
LSAP-B4, 3/18/2008
$ΔBorrowed Quantity
-$19,178
-$295
-$1,415
-$1,511
-10.93
-0.19
-5.77
-6.55
%ΔBorrowed Quantity
p-values
<0.01
0.64
<0.01
<0.01
All Buy Events
$ΔBorrowed Quantity
%ΔBorrowed Quantity
p-values
P1-Control
$ΔBorrowed Quantity
%ΔBorrowed Quantity

-$6,745
-3.79
<0.01

-$6,258
-3.44
<0.01
$360
0.17

-$1,589
-5.19
<0.01

-$1,587
-5.44
<0.01
$289
0.82
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Table 7
Post-announcement period change in short interest
For Borrowed Quantity, we present the mean for 3/26/2009, the first day of P4-Post, and3/31/2010, the
last day of P4-Post. Values are in millions of USD based on par value. Using a Wilcoxon rank sum test,
we test the null hypothesis that the means for these two dates are equal against the alternate hypothesis
that the mean of last date is less and present the resulting p-values.
Borrowed Quantity
Treasuries
Agencies
3/26/2009
$1,268.8
$48.8
3/31/2010
$1,040.3
$33.6
Difference ($ΔBorrowed Quantity)
$228.5
$15.2
p-value
0.16
<0.01
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Table 8
The effect of LSAP announcements of slowed purchases on short interest
The Fed made several announcements that indicated reduced purchases or that failed to raise expectations
of future expansions. For each announcement, we present the five-day dollar and percentage ΔBorrowed
Quantity before and after the announcement. We also present these two variables (1) averaged over these
four events, which we label “All Slow Events,” and (2) for our P1-Control for the 34 five-day periods
for all Treasuries and agencies. Values are in millions of USD based on par value. For Treasuries and
agencies, we jointly rank the %ΔBorrowed Quantity for each CUSIP for the control observations and the
before-announcement and the after-announcement observations. We test the null hypothesis that the
means of the ranks for the two samples are equal against the alternate hypothesis that the means for the
announcements decline more and report the p-values. This is equivalent to a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
Treasuries
Agencies
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Before
After
Before
After
LSAP-S1, 1/28/2009
$ΔBorrowed Quantity
$3,859
$2,407
-$106
$682
%ΔBorrowed Quantity
2.32
1.41
-0.39
2.49
p-values
1.00
0.90
0.37
0.96
LSAP-S2, 8/12/2009
$ΔBorrowed Quantity
$2,359
$711
-$33
$198
1.39
0.41
-0.16
0.95
%ΔBorrowed Quantity
p-values
0.24
0.39
0.46
0.95
LSAP-S3, 11/4/2009
$1,447
$222
$293
-$258
$ΔBorrowed Quantity
%ΔBorrowed Quantity
0.84
0.13
1.32
-1.15
0.98
0.24
0.89
0.23
p-values
All Slow Events
$ΔBorrowed Quantity
%ΔBorrowed Quantity
p-values

$2,555
1.52
0.99

P1-Control
$ΔBorrowed Quantity
%ΔBorrowed Quantity

$1,114
0.65
0.58
$360
0.17
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$51
0.26
0.66

$207
0.76
0.93
$289
0.82
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Panel A. 10-year Treasury yields change
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Fig 1. 10-year Treasury yields and futures price changes associated with QE announcements
We present 10-year Treasury yields and futures price changes around quantitative easing announcements
from November 2008 to June 2013. Treasury yields changes are the one-day change around each
announcement. Futures price changes are calculated from the quoted futures price 15 minutes before to 90
minutes after each announcement. The announcements identified by triangle marker are the four QE1
announcements that are the focus of our study. The labeled announcements are: 1, 11/25/2008; 2,
12/1/2008; 3, 12/16/2008; and 4, 3/18/2009.
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Fig 2. Behavior of interest rates during and following the Great Recession
We present nominal yields for 10-year U.S. Treasuries, agencies, and Federal Funds. The vertical lines
indicate the four LSAP announcement days that are the focus of our study.
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Fig 3. Cumulative interest rate changes on LSAP announcement dates
We present the cumulative daily interest rate changes on the four LSAP announcement days that are the
focus of our study.
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Fig 4. Quantity of Treasuries and agencies available to short and shorted, by day
We present the total daily Available Quantity and Borrowed Quantity (our proxies for securities available
to be shorted and actually shorted, respectively) for Treasuries (Panel A) and agencies (Panel B) from
1/1/2008 to 3/31/2010. The vertical lines indicate the four LSAP announcement days that are the focus of
our study. Values are in billions of USD and based on par value.
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Fig 5. Cumulative change in shorting
We present the daily cumulative %ΔBorrowed Quantity (our proxy for shorting) for Lehman
equity (Panel A) and Treasuries and agencies (Panel B) from 1/1/2008 to 3/31/2010.
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Appendix 1. $ΔBorrowed Quantity for our study period and for selected events
To show the importance of the four buy announcements that we study, Table A1-1 compares
the magnitude of the $ΔBorrowed Quantity for these events to net changes over subperiods. For
the 823 days from the beginning of Period 1-Control through Period 4-Post, the $ΔBorrowed

Quantity falls $123 billion for Treasuries and $19 billion for agencies (Panel A). As shown in
Panel B, for Treasuries and agencies the 44 days surrounding our four announcements account
for 43.9% and 67.5%, respectively, of the $ΔBorrowed Quantity over the 823-day period.
For comparison, Table A1, Panel B, also shows the change in short interest the week after
several other major events—the government takeover of Fannie and Freddie, the Lehman
bankruptcy, and the AIG bailout. Of these events, the Lehman bankruptcy was associated with
the largest impact on shorting with a $12 billion decrease in Borrowed Quantity. Although
omitted from the table, the $ΔBorrowed Quantity for Treasuries and agencies from five-days
before the government takeover of Fannie and Freddie (9/1/2008) to five-days after the AIG
bailout (9/24/2008) accounted for 33.46% (agencies) and 34.47% (Treasuries) of the total net
change during our sample period.
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Table A1-1
$ΔBorrowed Quantity for our study period and for selected events
To show the importance of the four buy announcements that we study, Panel A presents for comparison,
the $ΔBorrowed Quantity during each of our four periods and for the four periods collectively. For each
of our four announcements, in Panel B, we present the cumulative $ΔBorrowed Quantity from five days
before each announcement to five days after the announcements, which comprises changes over (4 X 11
=) 44 days. Also, to highlight the importance of our four announcements, Panel B also presents the
$ΔBorrowed Quantity for three particularly important days. We present data for both Treasuries and
agencies. Borrowed Quantity is reported in millions of USD based on par value.
Borrowed Quantity
Treasuries
Agencies
$Δ
Percentage
$Δ
Percentage
Panel A: Study periods
Period 1-Control
10,037
-8.15
7,036
-36.65
Period 2-Heart
-63,910
51.89
-4,000
20.84
Period 3-Announce
-41,163
33.43
-15,491
80.69
Period 4-Post
-28,113
22.83
-6,742
35.12
Period 1-Control through Period 4-Post
-123,149
100.00
-19,197
100.00

All 4 announcements (+/- 5 days)
Takeover of Fannie and Freddie
Lehman bankruptcy
AIG bailout

Panel B: Crisis events (+/- 5 days)
-54,024
43.87
-272
-12,725
-1,256
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-12,963
-37
-2,953
-1,256

67.53

Appendix 2: Robustness check for the effect of LSAP announcements on short interest
To supplement Table 6 in the body of the paper, we use Utilization (instead of Borrowed
Quantity) as our proxy for short interest in Table A2-1. These findings are consistent with Table
6.
Table A2-1
The effect of LSAP announcements on Utilization for all Treasury and agency issues
We analyze the four Fed announcements of LSAPs indicated below. For each announcement, we present
the five-day dollar and percentage ΔUtilization before and after the announcement. We also present these
two variables (1) averaged over these four events, which we label “All Buy Events,” and (2) for our P1Control that comprises 34 five-day periods. Values are in millions of USD based on par value. For
Treasuries and agencies, we jointly rank the %ΔUtilization for each CUSIP for the control observations
and the before-announcement and the after-announcement observations. We test the null hypothesis that
the means of the ranks for the two samples are equal against the alternate hypothesis that the means for
the announcements declined more and report the p-values. This is equivalent to a Wilcoxon rank sum
test.
Treasuries
Agencies
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Before
After
Before
After
LSAP-B1, 11/25/2008
ΔUtilization
-0.11
0.26
-2.77
-0.50
%ΔUtilization
-0.16
0.40
-6.32
-1.23
p-values
0.39
0.88
<0.01
1.00
LSAP-B2, 12/1/2008
0.26
-3.56
-0.50
-1.83
ΔUtilization
%ΔUtilization
0.40
-5.46
-1.23
-4.51
0.85
<0.01
1.00
0.00
p-values
LSAP-B3, 12/16/2008
ΔUtilization
-0.91
-3.67
-1.44
-1.12
%ΔUtilization
-1.51
-6.21
-3.96
-3.21
0.08
<0.01
0.01
0.01
p-values
LSAP-B4, 3/18/2008
ΔUtilization
-5.56
0.69
-3.44
-2.36
%ΔUtilization
-9.62
1.31
-10.72
-8.24
p-values
<0.01
0.67
0.28
<0.01
All Buy Events
ΔUtilization
%ΔUtilization
p-values
P1-Control
ΔUtilization
%ΔUtilization

-1.58
-2.72
<0.01

-1.57
-2.49
<0.01
0.02
0.04

-2.04
-5.56
0.01

-1.45
-4.30
0.03
0.09
0.26
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Appendix 3: Changes in shorting for purchased and not-purchased securities
At the time of the announcements, the Fed typically discloses the type of security (Treasury or
agency) and the dollar amount of the forthcoming purchases, but does not disclose specific
CUSIPs. In addition, with the exception of the last QE1 announcement on 3/18/2009 (LSAP-B4),
the Fed does not disclose the security characteristics (such as time-to-maturity) of targeted
securities at announcement time.21 Therefore, at the time of the announcement, we expect to see
no differences in the reaction of Borrowed Quantity for the securities that are eventually
purchased and not-purchased.

Do announcements affect the Borrowed Quantity of purchased/not-purchased differently?
Table A3-1 reports the results of Hypothesis 2—that short sellers do not distinguish between
purchased and not-purchased securities after policy announcements. For each announcement and
for all announcements, for both Treasuries and agencies, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
means of the %∆Borrowed Quantity of purchased versus not-purchased are equal (except for
agencies for LSAP-B4). Hence, we find no difference in the short sellers’ reactions for securities
purchased and not-purchased either before or after the policy announcements. We conclude that
shorts either cannot discern or do not care which securities will be purchased around
announcement times.

Is there a differential effect on securities purchased and not-purchased following the purchases?
We now shift away from examining behavior around announcements to examining behavior
over the entire purchase period. The data on bond purchases are weekly. Table A3-2 shows the
effect of the Fed’s purchases on Available Quantity and Borrowed Quantity of agencies at the
21

Following LSAP-B4, the Open Market Trading Desk announced that it “will concentrate purchases in the 2- to 10year sector of the nominal Treasury curve, although purchases will occur across the nominal Treasury and TIPS yield
curves.”
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beginning and end of the purchase period. We restrict our analysis to agencies because the Fed
purchased some of almost every Treasury CUSIP during the period of our study. During the
purchase period, Available Quantity declined about 31% and Borrowed Quantity declined about
57%. There is little difference between the declines for securities purchased and not-purchased.
Hence, we conclude that there was no difference in the effect of the Fed’s unconventional
policies on Available Quantity or Borrowed Quantity of securities purchased and not-purchased.
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Table A3-1
The effect of LSAP announcements on short interest of Treasuries and agencies, purchased versus notpurchased
For issues purchased and not-purchased as part of the LSAP program, we present mean %ΔBorrowed
Quantity for Treasuries and agencies, in turn, for each of the four LSAPs announcements and for all
announcements. We weight the %ΔBorrowed Quantity based on issue size. We test the null hypothesis
that the means of the %ΔBorrowed Quantity are equal for issues purchased and not-purchased against the
alternate hypothesis that the means for the purchased issues declined more. We present results for the five
days before each announcement in columns 2-4 and for the five days after each announcement in columns
5-7. We report p-values for these tests. To minimize the effects of outliers, we winsorize the data at the
0.01 and 0.99 levels.
%ΔBorrowed Quantity
Before
After
Purchased
Purchased
Yes
No
p-value
Yes
No
p-value
Panel A: Treasuries
-1.51
LSAP-B1
-0.90
LSAP-B2
-1.18
LSAP-B3
-9.81
LSAP-B4

-6.54
2.67
0.24
-12.44

0.96
0.17
0.27
0.87

-0.89
-5.97
-6.45
2.47

13.93
-5.64
-4.98
-5.86

0.08
0.48
0.37
0.98

-3.57

-4.01

0.61

-2.56

-0.63

0.28

Panel B: Agencies
-0.69
LSAP-B1
-0.58
LSAP-B2
-8.05
LSAP-B3
-8.15
LSAP-B4

-12.43
-1.64
-4.86
-3.51

1.00
0.72
0.11
0.03

-0.24
-5.06
-3.79
-1.79

-1.39
-8.16
-6.32
-8.84

0.72
0.87
0.84
0.97

All

-5.64

0.85

-2.70

-6.18

0.99

All

-4.42
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Table A3-2
Effect during the purchase period of Fed purchases of agencies for securities purchased and notpurchased
For agencies that are and are not purchased, we present the Available Quantity (Panel A) and Borrowed
Quantity (Panel B) on the first (12/10/2008) and last day (3/31/2010) of the purchase period and both the
dollar and percentage change of each variable. For agencies purchased, we include the 55 securities that
are in our sample on both dates. For agencies not purchased, we include the 55 largest securities in our
sample on both dates. Values are in millions of USD based on par value. Using CUSIP-level data
(winsorized at the 0.01 and 0.99 levels), we test the null hypothesis that the mean percentage changes of
the two samples are equal against the alternate hypothesis that the means for the securities purchased
declined more and report the p-values.
Purchased
Yes
No
p-value
Panel A: Available Quantity
12/10/2008
$37,768
$2,120
3/31/2010
$25,900
$1,454
$ΔAvailable Quantity
-$11,868
-$665
%ΔAvailable Quantity
-31.42
-31.38
0.38
Panel B: Borrowed Quantity
12/10/2008
3/31/2010
$ΔBorrowed Quantity
%ΔBorrowed Quantity

$19,398
$8,417
-$10,980
-56.61

$509
$212
-$297
-58.37
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0.29

Appendix 4. Federal Reserve unconventional monetary policy announcements from 2008 to mid-2013
Table A4-1
Unconventional monetary policy announcements
Date
Program
Description
11/25/2008
QE1
LSAP announced: Fed will purchase $100 billion in GSE debt and $500 billion in MBS
12/1/2008
QE1
Chairman Bernanke says in a speech that the Fed could purchase long-term Treasuries
12/16/2008
QE1
First suggestion of extending QE to Treasuries by FOMC. Fed cuts Fed Funds rate
1/28/2009
QE1
Fed stands ready to expand QE and buy Treasuries
LSAP expanded: Fed will purchase $300 billion in long-term Treasuries and an additional $750 and $100 billion
3/18/2009
QE1
in MBS and GSE debt, respectively. Fed expects low rates for "an extended period."
8/12/2009
QE1
LSAP slowed: All purchases will finish by the end of October, not mid-September
9/23/2009
QE1
LSAP slowed: Agency debt and MBS purchases will finish at the end of 2010Q1
11/4/2009
QE1
LSAP downsized: Agency debt purchases will finish at $175 billion
8/10/2010
QE1
Balance Sheet Maintained: Fed will reinvest principal payments from LSAP purchases in Treasuries
8/27/2010
QE2
Bernanke suggests role for additional QE, "should further action prove necessary"
9/21/2010
QE2
FOMC emphasize low inflation, which is "is likely to remain subdued for some time"
10/12/2010
QE2
FOMC members "sense" is that "[additional] accommodation may be appropriate before long"
10/15/2010
QE2
Bernanke reiterates that Fed stands ready to further ease policy
11/3/2010
QE2
QE2 announced: Fed will purchase $600 billion in Treasuries
QE2 finishes: Treasury purchases will wrap up at the end of month; principal payments will continue to be
6/22/2011
QE2
reinvested
9/21/2011
MEP
MEP ("Operation Twist") announced
6/20/2012
MEP
MEP extended until end of 2012
8/22/2012
QE3
FOMC members "judged that additional monetary accommodation would likely be warranted fairly soon…"
QE3 announced: Fed will purchase $40 billion of MBS per month as long as "the outlook for the labor market
9/13/2012
QE3
does not improve substantially…in the context of price stability"
QE3 expanded: Fed will continue purchasing $45 billion of long-term Treasuries per month but will no longer
12/12/2012
QE3
sterilize purchases through the sale of short-term Treasuries
FOMC will "continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per
6/19/2013
QE3
month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month." Statement indicates no funds
target rises in 2013
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Chapter 3
Supply and demand shifts of shorts prior to Fed announcements during QE1 – QE3
1. Introduction
Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) show that shorting demand is an important predictor of
future stock returns. We investigate whether shorting demand is a predictor of unconventional
Fed policy announcements during Quantitative Easing 1 (QE1), 2008-2010; QE 2, 2010-2011;
the Maturity Extension Period (MEP), 2011-2012; and QE 3, 2012-2014.
Short sellers are widely viewed as informed, sophisticated investors. In equity markets, short
sales correctly predict negative returns (Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan, 1998; Boehmer,
Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009; Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2007) and
shorts have superior ability to process news (Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2012). In bond
markets, Hendershott, Kozhan, and Roman (2017) find that corporate bond shorts predict future
bond returns; Nashikkar and Pedersen (2007) find that shorts anticipate rating changes. In
contrast, Asquith, Au, Covert, and Pathak (2013) find that heavily-shorted corporate bonds do
not earn abnormal returns.
We find the demand for short positions for Treasuries and agencies decreases prior to Fed
buy announcements.

2. Data and research methodology
Our sample of Treasuries and agencies comes from Markit Securities Finance. Prime brokers,
custodians, asset managers, and hedge funds, report these lending data. Our proxies are: short
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interest, Borrowed Quantity, the par value of debt on loan; shorting cost, Borrowing Fee, the bps
fee. We collect data for 2007-2017. Intervals without an announcement are our control period.
We obtain time-to-maturity from Datastream. Our sample comprises securities with (1) timeto-maturity > 5 years at least once, (3) mean Available Quantity of greater than $10 million, (4)
mean Borrowed Quantity greater than $1 million, and (5) at least 30 daily observations.
We focus on important Fed announcements during QE1, QE2, MEP, and QE3. We classify
these announcements as “buy” and “slow” based on the announcement language and the change
on the 10-year Treasury yield the day after the announcement. Buy announcements have both
expansionary language and decreased yields. Slow announcements have contractionary or
decreased policy actions and increased yields. We eliminate announcements that do not fit into
either of these categories. A list and description of buy and slow announcements is provided in
Table 1.
To understand the ability of shorts to predict Fed announcements, we employ a technique
developed in Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) that infers shifts in supply and demand curves
by examining combinations of price and quantity changes. Securities are classified as follows:
increase in Borrowed Quantity and Borrowing Fee indicates a demand curve shift out (DOUT);
decrease in Borrowed Quantity and Borrowing Fee indicates a demand shift in (DIN); increase in

Borrowed Quantity and a decrease in Borrowing Fee indicates a supply curve shift out (SOUT);
and decrease in Borrowed Quantity and an increase in Borrowing Fee indicates a supply curve
shift in (SIN). If there is a decline in the demand for borrowing following the LSAP
announcements, we expect a DIN. Aggarwal, Bai, and Laeven (2016) employ a similar technique
in their study of European government bond lending markets during periods of market stress. We
test two hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1: Securities experience a DIN prior to buy announcements
Buy announcements reduce the demand for securities to short, reducing the Borrowing Fee and

Borrowed Quantity.
Hypothesis 2: Securities experience a DOUT prior to slow announcements
Slow announcements increase the demand for securities to short, increasing the Borrowing Fee
and Borrowed Quantity.
Given that shorts are believed to be informed, we expect that the changes will occur prior to
the announcements. To test these hypothesis, we compare the distribution of shifts prior to the
announcements with the distribution for a control sample using the chi-squared test of equality.

3. Empirical results
We test our hypotheses using one week and one month intervals prior to the announcements.
The results are broadly consistent across time periods, but become slightly more pronounced for
slow announcements when looking at months, indicating that shorts anticipate Fed moves farther
out than one week.
In Table 2, Panels A and B, we assess shifts in supply and demand one week prior to the
announcements. For buy announcements, DIN is the largest shift category with 44% for agencies
and 42% for Treasuries. The second largest group is SOUT (25%) for agencies and SIN (23%)
for Treasuries. Using the chi-squared test, we reject the null hypothesis that the shift categories
distribution for buy announcements is equal to the control distribution for both agencies and
Treasuries (p-value <0.001), supporting Hypothesis 1. For slow announcements, DOUT is the
largest shift category for agencies (31%) and SOUT is the largest shift category for Treasuries
(27%). For agencies, we fail to reject he null hypothesis that the distribution of the slow
announcements is the same as that of the control group; however, for Treasuries, we reject the
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null at the 10% level based on the chi-squared test. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 2 for DOUT
prior to slow announcements for both agencies and Treasuries using a one week window.
Table 2, Panels C and D, report results for the longest shift window in our study: one month.
For buy announcements, we find support for Hypothesis 1. The distributions are significantly
different than the control and the largest category is DIN for agencies and Treasuries (52% and
37%, respectively). For slow announcements, we do not find support for Hypothesis 2 as the
largest category agencies and Treasuries is not DOUT.

4. Conclusion
The unique approach of Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) provides a tool to test whether
shorts predicted Fed announcements during QE1 – QE3. To summarize our findings, for both
agencies and Treasuries, we find that the majority of securities experience a demand shift inward
one week and one month prior to Fed buy announcements. Further, the distribution of shifts prior
to buy announcements is statistically different than for our control period.
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Table 1
QE announcements and classification.
Buy Events
11/25/2008 FOMC announces intended purchases of $100 billion in GSE debt and up to
$500 billion in MBS.
12/1/2008
Bernanke speech Chairman Bernanke says that the Fed could purchase longterm Treasuries.
12/16/2008 FOMC statement FOMC first mentions possible purchase of long-term
Treasuries.
3/18/2009
FOMC statement FOMC says it will purchase an additional $750 billion in
agency MBS, increase its purchases of agency debt by up to $100 billion, and
buy up to $300 billion in long-term Treasuries.
8/10/2010
FOMC statement FOMC states that it will continue to roll over the Federal
Reserve holdings of Treasury securities as they mature.
9/21/2010
FOMC statement FOMC states that the Federal Reserve will continue to roll
over its holdings of Treasury securities as they mature.
9/21/2011
"The Fed kept policy rates unchanged and exceptionally low but the Fed also
decided to engage in a form of Operation Twist."
8/22/2012
"The debate within the Fed about potential additional policy actions has heated
up according to the latest FOMC minutes. Many participants said more
accommodation is needed unless there is substantial improvement in the
economy. But participants also indicated that discussion of the costs and
benefits of additional quantitative easing was useful. Some questioned the
efficacy of a QE3."
12/12/2012 Maturity Extension Program concludes. FOMC to begin purchasing longerterm Treasuries at an initial pace of $45 billion per month
6/18/2014
FOMC will "continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed
securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and longer-term Treasury
securities at a pace of $45 billion per month"
Slow Events
1/28/2009
FOMC is ready to expand agency debt and MBS purchases, as well as to
purchase long-term Treasuries; however, this event is regarded as
disappointing markets
8/27/2010
Bernanke suggests role for additional QE; however, this event is regarded as
disappointing markets
10/15/2010
Bernanke speech
12/18/2013 "Beginning in January, the Committee will add to its holdings of agency
mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $35 billion per month rather than $40
billion per month, and will add to its holdings of longer-term Treasury
securities at a pace of $40 billion per month rather than $45 billion per month."
6/19/2013
"...Fed Chairman Bernanke stated that if the members' forecasts were correct,
economic conditions would improve to the point that by the end of this year,
the Fed could start tapering their purchases of securities."
3/19/2014
Fed will further reduce monthly asset purchases to $25 billion in MBS and $30
billion in Treasuries.
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Table 2
Supply and demand shifts.
We present statistics for shifts in supply and demand following the announcements for
Treasuries one week before (Panels A), agencies one week before (Panels B),
Treasuries one month before, and agencies one month before (Panel D) the buy and
slow announcements and during the control period. For each security, we calculate the
change for quantity demanded (Borrowed Quantity) and borrowing cost (Borrowing
Fee). Following Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2007), we define four mutually-exclusive
demand-supply shifts for securities: DIN, a decrease in Borrowed Quantity and a
decrease in Borrowing Fee; DOUT, an increase in Borrowed Quantity and an increase
in Borrowing Fee; SIN, a decrease in Borrowed Quantity and an increase in Borrowing
Fee and SOUT, an increase in Borrowed Quantity and a decrease in Borrowing Fee.
Securities that did not experience a shift are excluded. We report the number and
percent of bonds in each category. Using a Chi-squared test, we test the null hypothesis
that the shift categories distribution for buy and slow announcements, respectively, is
equal to the control distribution and present the resulting p-values.
DIN

DOUT

SIN

SOUT

Total

p-value

Panel A: Agencies (One week)
Control

N
%

3,199
25%

3,370
26%

3,321
26%

3,097
24%

12,987
100%

Buy

N
%

156
44%

48
14%

59
17%

88
25%

351
100%

<.0001

N
%

31
20%

48
31%

36
23%

40
26%

155
100%

0.3303

Slow

Panel B: Treasuries (One week)
Control

N
%

10,768
25%

11,389
26%

11,067
25%

10,510
24%

43,734
100%

Buy

N
%

401
42%

140
15%

219
23%

186
20%

946
100%

<.0001

N
%

154
27%

143
25%

121
21%

158
27%

576
100%

0.0576

Slow
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Table 2 —Continued
Panel C: Agencies (One month)
Control

N
%

1,214
27%

1,092
24%

1,272
28%

969
21%

4,547
100%

Buy

N
%

386
52%

57
8%

91
12%

212
28%

746
100%

<.0001

N
%

41
29%

37
26%

25
18%

38
27%

141
100%

0.0419

Slow

Panel D: Treasuries (One month)
Control

N
%

3,877
27%

3,186
22%

3,726
26%

3,423
24%

14,212
100%

Buy

N
%

558
37%

235
15%

473
31%

261
17%

1,527
100%

<.0001

N
%

263
32%

158
19%

125
15%

267
33%

813
100%

<.0001

Slow
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